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This paper analyzes the impact of two anti-crime programs implemented in Chile in 
the late 1990s. The first (Quadrant Plan) is related to enhancing the quality of police 
work and the second one (Secure County Plan) to the involvement of the community 
in designing specific projects aimed at reducing the crime rate. It is found that only 
the Quadrant Plan has been successful in terms of reducing crime rates and has 
caused its impact through the effect of arrests in deterring crime. The Secure County 
program does not appear to have any impact on crime rates. It is also found that crime 
is associated with unemployment and that there is persistence in crime rates. 
 
Keywords: Crime; Anti-crime programs; GMM. 




1.   Introduction 
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate empirically whether crime prevention 
programs implemented in Chile during the last ten years have been effective. In the last 
couple of decades, there has been a huge increase in delinquency. While in 1990, robbery 
complaints were 586 per 100,000 inhabitants, they had more than doubled by 2007. 
Opinion polls show that crime has moved from being one of the top five concerns of the 
population in the 1990s to being the most important concern for the last five years (Figure 
1). Recent polls on citizen security show that in about 35% of households, at least one of 
the members has been the victim of a crime.
1  
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the rate of robbery complaints at a national level 
since 1990. There is a clear upward trend in the series, with an important acceleration at 
the end of last decade. The average annual rate of increase is 5.8%.  
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At the end of last decade and the beginning of this one, two crime-fighting plans were 
implemented, the Quadrant Plan (Plan Cuadrante) and the Secure County Plan (Comuna 
Segura). The first one is a program that basically connects the community with the police 
and enhances the monitoring by the police in the area covered by the plan. The Secure 
County Plan is designed to involve the community in the prevention and control of crime 
through initiatives proposed by the community itself. The Quadrant Plan is a program 4 
 
directed at having more policing, but in which the connection between the police and the 
community is enhanced, thus the efficiency of policing is incremented. Hence, the 
objective is not only to have more police in a given area, but also to improve the quality 
of their work.
2 The Secure County Plan is a program in which the community presents 
the central government with projects to reduce crime and bids for competitive funding for 
these projects.
3 The projects have included initiatives such as building community centers 
for the youth, lighting streets and public places better, sports centers, and the like.
4 
Interestingly, the rough data do not suggest that the two anti-crime programs have 
had a major impact on delinquency rates. On the contrary, crime rates continued their 
upward trend even after the introduction of these two programs. Of course, there are 
many variables we need to control. Perhaps the most important is the business cycle. In 
1999, unemployment rose significantly, from 6% to 10%, and remained around that level 
until 2004. This was related to the first recession in Chile in 1999 after 15 years. 
Coincidently, crimes rates started to show an upward trend at the end of the 1990s. Since 
2004, unemployment has decreased; however, robbery complaints remained at a higher 
level. This suggests that there might be time persistence or hysteresis in the robbery rate 
since once it increased at the end of the 1990s, it remained at the higher levels.  
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I discuss the factors that might be 
associated with the delinquency rate and I revise the recent literature on the subject. The 
variables, data and methodology are discussed in section 3. This section also contains a 
more detailed description of the two anti-crime programs mentioned above. The 
estimations are presented in Section 4. I first use data at a regional level and then at a 
municipal level. The results are robust. They show that only one of the two programs, the 5 
 
Quadrant Plan, has been successful in reducing delinquency rates and that its effect is 
through the arrest ratio. That is, the Quadrant Plan increases the deterrent effect of the 
probability of arrest and through this channel, reduces crime. The Secure County program 
does not appear to have any impact on crime rates. We also find that the increase in the 
unemployment rate associated with the recession of 1999 seems to be an important factor 
that determines the jump in the crime rate starting at that time. Estimations also support 
the hypothesis of persistence. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2.    A preliminary analysis of the factors determining crime 
 
The literature on the determinants of crime is ample.
5 We are not interested in a 
comprehensive review of the literature, so this section will focus on the literature that is 
more relevant to the issue that it is investigated in this paper. For analytical purposes, the 
factors determining crime can be classified in four broad categories. The first is related to 
demographic and biological factors. Gender and age, for instance, are variables related to 
crime. In all societies where data exist, crime is more frequent in men than in women.
6 
There is also a consistent pattern which shows that delinquency increases during 
adolescence, reaching its peak before age 20 and then declining gradually (Blumenstein 
et al., 1986). The second category is related to family and social factors. A central factor 
is the household situation. Inadequate parental supervision, for instance, seems to be 
related to youth crime. Donohue and Siegelman (1998) have argued that early family 
intervention reduces delinquency. Glaeser et al. (1996) argue that social interaction 
(criminals acting together) explains the high cross-city variance of crime rates. Falk and 
Fischbacher (2002) present an experimental study where people can engage in “criminal” 6 
 
activities to study social interaction phenomena. They find that on average, subjects steal 
more, the more others steal. Zenou (2003), studying the spatial aspects of crime, finds 
that an individual is more likely to commit a crime if his peers commit crimes than if they 
do not commit.  
Donohue and Levitt (2001) present evidence that legalized abortion in the U.S. has 
contributed significantly to recent crime reductions, the channel being the reduction in 
unwanted children. In the case of Chile, there is evidence (Valenzuela, 2006) that the lack 
of parental concern increases drug use and the criminal activity of children. Social factors 
also include aspects such as social capital. Lederman et al. (2002) find that the sense of 
trust among community members has a significant negative effect on homicide rates. 
However, they do not find clear effects of other social capital variables, such as religion-
related variables and involvement in social organizations.  
A third category of factors determining crime is associated with the judicial system. 
In the seminal work of Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973), it is assumed that criminals 
behave rationally; hence, they respond to incentives. There are benefits and costs of crime 
and the individual considers both when maximizing the expected utility. The benefits are 
represented by the proceeds obtained from a criminal activity as compared to the income 
obtained from a non-criminal activity (in tax evasion, for instance, the benefits are 
represented by the lower tax paid) and the costs of the penalties imposed by the judicial 
system on apprehended criminals. The greater the cost and the probability of being 
apprehended, the lower crime is. Ehrlich (1973, 1975) finds that crime is sensitive to the 
expected size of punishment. More recent literature (Levitt, 1996 & 1997) takes into 
account endogeneity issues and finds a significant effect of policing and punishment on 7 
 
crime deterrence. Higher rates of incarceration (Marvell and Moody, 1994; Levitt, 1996) 
have also been found to reduce crime.  Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004) study the effect 
on crime of exogenous reallocation of police forces.
7  They find a large deterrent effect of 
observable police on crime. However, the effect is local, with no observable effect 
outside the area in which the police are deployed. For the case of Chile, Núñez et al. 
(2003) find that police effectiveness, measured by the ratio of apprehensions to crime, is 
negatively correlated to crime. 
The fourth category relates to economic factors. Of course, these factors can also be 
associated with previous models since economic factors affect the benefits and costs of 
crime. Grogger (1998) finds that wages are important determinants of crime. He also 
argues that as criminal behavior responds to wages, then the age distribution of crime 
may be a labor market phenomenon. The steep rise in wages with age explains, according 
to this author, why crime falls with age. Unemployment, poverty and inequality have also 
been associated with crime. Öster and Agell (2007), in a study for Sweden, find that 
general unemployment has a significant effect on some crimes (burglary, auto theft and 
drug possession), but they find no evidence that youth unemployment matters in crime. 
Soares and Naritomi (2008) present evidence for Latin America in which most of the 
seemingly excessively high violence in the region can be explained by great inequality, 
low incarceration rates and small police forces. Fajnzylber et al. (2002a) investigate the 
robustness and causality between violent crime and income inequality across countries. 
They find that both variables are positively correlated within countries and, particularly, 
between countries, and that this correlation reflects causality from inequality to crime 
rates. On the other hand, Machin and Meghir (2004) present evidence that drops in the 8 
 
wages of unskilled workers lead to increases in crime, reflecting poorer labor market 
opportunities. 
Social and economic factors can also explain why several empirical studies on crime 
have found inertia, which is modeled using the lagged dependent variable (Fajnzylber et 
al. 2002b; Buonanno and Montolio, 2005). Indeed, past crime can affect current criminal 
behavior for several reasons.  First, criminals learn by doing, hence once a criminal 
begins to commit crimes, his expected costs of crime fall, while the expected benefits 
increase. This produces hysteresis since once crime increases for any reason, it stays at a 
higher level. Second, as more people get involved in criminal activities, being a criminal 
is more socially “acceptable.” Finally, having a criminal record reduces job opportunities, 
reducing the cost of crime and making the commission of crime more attractive. 
  The focus of this paper is on the effects of programs designed to reduce crime. We 
control by demographic, economic and social factors, but our interest is in determining 
whether the two anti-crime programs established in Chile in the late 90s and early 2000s 
have had an impact on crime. 
 
 
3.  Methodology, variables and data 
     
  Based on our previous discussion, we hypothesized the following relationship: 
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  Where the subscripts indicate the i
th location and the t
th year. The dependent variable 
C is the crime rate, while X is a set of demographic, economic, institutional and social 9 
 
variables determining crime. Z is a set of variables that represent the crime prevention 
programs being implemented in each location at a given time.  i   is a location fixed 
effect and  it  a time fixed effect. Finally,  it  is a well-behaved error term distributed 
iid(0,
2
v  ). The inertia effect on crime is captured by the lagged value of the dependent 
variable. 
  We estimate our model using the dynamic panel data estimators proposed by 
Arellano-Bond (1991). The GMM method proposed by Arellano and Bond  allows past 
realizations of the dependent variable to  affect its current level, and it is also designed for 
situations in which independent variables are not strictly exogenous, that is to say, 
correlated with past, and possibly current, realizations of the error. As discussed below, 
there are good reasons to think that the crime prevention programs implemented in the 
last decade in Chile are not exogenous since they were implemented gradually, starting, 
to some degree, in municipalities with the highest crime rates. 
  Arellano and Bond derive a GMM estimator in which first differences of endogenous 
variables are instrumented with lags of their own levels. Keeping in mind that the number 
of instruments could get large relative to the number of observations, we estimated trying 
to keep the number of instruments as low as possible.  
  The consistency of the GMM estimator depends on whether lagged values of the 
explanatory variables are valid instruments. To test the validity of the instruments, we use 
the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions. Failure to reject the null hypothesis of 
overall validity of the instruments supports our results. We also test the hypothesis that 





  Two sets of data are used. The first is a panel of 13 regions, with observations for 
the period 1990-2006. The second is a panel of 245 municipalities for the same period.
9 
One of the problems with the studies which relate crime to different variables is that most 
databases (particularly for developing countries) contain data on crime in a given location 
and characteristics of people living in that location. But as crime can be committed in a 
location different from the perpetrator’s home location, the estimated relationship can be 
spurious. That is the reason why we initiate our estimates using regions rather than 
municipalities. A region is a much larger geographical location; hence, it is much more 
difficult to think that a person will go to another region to commit a crime, particularly if 
it is robbery, which is the type of crime that we use in our estimates. When we move to a 
municipal level, we use all counties except for the Metropolitan Region (Santiago) 
municipalities. The reason is that Chile is a very centralized country and the Metropolitan 
Region´s 52 municipalities concentrate 40% of the population. These are geographically 
small municipalities with a high population density. Hence, the assumption that people do 
not go to another municipality to commit robbery is not a reasonable assumption for the 
Metropolitan Region. However, this assumption is more reasonable for the rest of the 
country, where municipalities are much larger in size and with a much lower population 
density.
10 
  The variable to explain will be the level of crime by location (region and 
municipality) measured by robbery complaints per 100,000 inhabitants. Although this 
indicator is an imperfect measure of criminality because it could be affected by several 
factors that do not affect criminality (such as changes in the judicial system), in Chile 11 
 
there is no other long-term panel with information on crime (or victimization).  In 
addition, as noted by Ehrlich (1973), as long as the measurement errors are random, the 
relative variation in robbery complaints would be an unbiased approximation of the true 
crime rate. Surveys that compare the true rate of robbery at a national level with the rate 
of robbery complaints show that the difference between them is remarkably stable (see 
Table 1). In any case, we also control by institutional changes that might have affected 
the rate of robbery complaints over time. 
 
[Table 1 around here] 
  
 
  The robbery data were obtained from the Police Statistical Yearbooks. According to 
the Chilean Penal Code, “anyone who, against the will of the owner and in the intent to 
profit, takes control of other people's personal property using violence, intimidation or 
force, commits robbery; absent violence, intimidation or force, the crime is defined as 
theft.” The reason to use robbery and not other crimes is that on the one hand, more 
violent crimes, such as homicide and rape, are also determined by other factors that are 
more difficult to measure and for which there is a lack of information, at least for the case 
of Chile (such as physiological factors). For the less violent crimes, such as theft (defined 
the same way as robbery, but without violence), casual evidence suggests that there is 
huge and variable underreporting, which can produce spurious correlations.
11  
  Following the literature on crime discussed in the previous section, we divided the 
explanatory variables into socioeconomic and demographic variables, variables related to 
the cost of breaking the law (the judicial system), and variables related to the crime 
prevention plans that are the focus of this paper. 12 
 
  Socioeconomic and demographic variables at a regional and municipal level were 
obtained from the 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2003 and 2006 Surveys of 
Socioeconomic Characteristics of the Chilean Population (CASEN)
12 and from the 
National Institute of Statistics (INE). Variables obtained from the CASEN surveys 
include the percentage of female heads-of-households (as a percentage of the total 
population by region or municipality), average age of the population, percentage of 
female population, percentage of urban population (relative to total population), 
percentage of individuals who are below the poverty line (as a percentage of the total 
population) and income inequality (measured as the ratio between the average income of 
the population at the highest and lowest quintile of income distribution). We also include 
a variable indicating the average difference between the age of the mother and her oldest 
son. This would be a proxy of undesired children (in Levitt’s terminology
13). 
  The data on the regional unemployment rate are obtained from the National Institute 
of Statistics. This variable is especially interesting since as seen in Figure 2, robbery 
complaints jump significantly at the end of the 1990s, which is precisely the same time 
when Chile experienced its first recession in 15 years and unemployment climbed from 
6% to 10%. In Figure 3, we plot regional robbery complaints per 100,000 inhabitants vis-
à-vis the regional unemployment rate. The figure shows a positive correlation between 
robbery complaints and the unemployment rate. In fact, the correlation between these 
series is 0.56.  
 
[Figure 3 around here] 
 13 
 
  To measure the cost of breaking the law, we used robbery and theft arrests as a ratio 
of robbery and theft complaints. This variable is a proxy of the probability of being 
arrested. We decided to use this variable instead of robbery arrests relative to robbery 
complaints in order to avoid a possible spurious correlation. In fact, if we used robbery 
arrests as compared to robbery complaints, it could be argued that a negative coefficient 
might simply be the result of the fact that robbery complaints (the dependent variable) are 
also in the denominator of this explanatory variable. We obtained the data from the Police 
Statistical Yearbooks. We expect that an increase in the probability of being arrested 
reduces the crime rate.  
  Starting in 2001, a penal justice reform was gradually implemented in the country. It 
started that year in some regions and its implementation concluded at the end of 2005. 
The reform consisted of changing the previous inquisitorial criminal procedure system, 
characterized by the use of written documents and judicial secrecy. The old system 
placed the functions of investigation, the filing of charges, and sentencing processes in 
criminal cases in the hands of a single person: the judge. In contrast, the new Code of 
Criminal Procedure establishes an accusatory and adversarial system in which the public 
prosecutor’s office is charged with independently investigating crimes and filing charges. 
It also led to the creation of the criminal public defender’s office, which ensures that 
defendants receive a professional defense. The judicial reform is also characterized by the 
use of oral proceedings instead of written ones. It could be argued that the new system 
might have an impact on crime reporting since it facilitates victims reporting crime and 
makes it mandatory for the police to formally fill in a complaint if they catch a 
perpetrator in the act of committing a crime.
14  For this reason, we also included a 14 
 
dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 from the moment the reform was 
implemented in a region. 
  Finally, we included variables related to the anti-delinquency plans implemented by 
the Chilean government in the last decade: Quadrant Plan (Plan Cuadrante) and Secure 
County Plan (Comuna Segura). 
  Quadrant Plan is a program of preventive monitoring 24 hours a day. Its objective is 
to diminish the levels of delinquency and violence in the population, through the 
establishment of a new modality of preventive work. In this new modality, a territory is 
delimited (called a “quadrant”) and its monitoring is assigned to a specific number of 
police officers, who are in charge of protecting its security. The quadrants into which the 
jurisdictional territory of the police unit is divided depends on the amount of square 
kilometers to patrol, the size of the population, its social composition, predominant 
economic activities and the degree of danger and criminality in the sector. In densely 
populated urban sectors, the territory to patrol corresponds approximately to one square 
kilometer. Thus, for instance, the Metropolitan Region is divided into 251 quadrants, 
each under the responsibility of a delegate and three assistants, who must take care of the 
demands of the population, receive complaints and attend the meetings of the County 
Security Council.  
  The selection of the municipalities in which the program is implemented is 
determined by the following variables (weights in parenthesis): police service demand 
(10%), level and deficit of police resources (20%), unemployment rate (10%), 
victimization index (40%), and drug prevalence (20%). Since the decision to introduce 15 
 
the Quadrant Plan in a county is at least partially determined by the level of criminality in 
the municipality, we could expect the variable Quadrant Plan to be endogenous. 
  In the regional estimates, the variable Quadrant Plan is measured as the percentage of 
regional population that is monitored according to this plan.
15 Since it is introduced by 
municipality, we calculate the population of the municipalities that have implemented a 
Quadrant Plan in a region in a given year and divided it by the population of that region 
in the same year. Figure 4 shows the evolution of the population covered by a Quadrant 
Plan at a national level. It is worth noting that this program has extended from covering 
only the Metropolitan Region (40% of the population) in 2001, to twelve regions in 2008, 
covering nearly 75% of the Chilean population (88 counties), and it is expected that by 
the end of 2010, nearly 80% of the population  (100 counties) will be covered by this 
plan.  
 
[Figure 4 around here] 
   
  In the estimates at a municipal level, the variable Quadrant Plan is a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 from the moment the Plan is introduced in that municipality. 
  The program Secure County was first implemented in 2001. This is a crime 
prevention program that originated in an agreement between the Ministry of the Interior, 
the Chilean Association of Municipalities and Fundación Paz Ciudadana (Citizen Peace 
Foundation).
16 Its main objective is to involve the community in the prevention and 
control of crime through the Councils of Citizen Security. Each Council is presided by 
the mayor of the municipality and members include police personnel, municipal council 16 
 
members and representatives of the community. Its objective is to determine the main 
concerns of the community related to crime and security and to coordinate the initiatives 
that are promoted in the county by designing an action plan. The central government, 
through a competitive funding mechanism, assigns the available funds to the initiatives 
that are considered more suitable to reducing crime.  
    As there is available data on the resources invested by each municipality in this 
program, this variable is measured as the per capita resources invested in the program. 
For the municipal estimates, it is the total resources invested by each municipality 
divided by its population. For the regional estimates, the variable is calculated as total 
resources invested by all municipalities with the program within a region divided by the 
regional population. We decided to use per capita annual investment in the program 
rather than the percentage of the population covered by the program, like we did with the 
Quadrant Plan, because in this case, this variable contains valuable information on the 
intensity of the plan in each region.
17  
  The program is financed annually through the 
 National Budget. Figure 5 shows the evolution of the per capita annual investment in the 
program at a national level. As can be seen from this figure, per capita investment in the 
program Secure County more than tripled between 2001 and 2005. The coverage of the 
program at a national level was 12% in 2001, increasing to more than 67% in 2005.  By 
the end of 2006, the program was redesigned and instead of using a competitive funding 
mechanism, the funds are directly delivered to municipalities according to a pre-approved 
budget. The reason for this change was that on the one hand, there was the feeling that the 
projects being approved were not really anti-crime projects, but rather pet projects of the 17 
 
local authorities that had different objectives. In fact, although no formal evaluation of 
the plan was made, the central government authority recognized that the program 
required modifications.
18 Moreover, as projects were implemented by local communities, 
it was very difficult to conduct a follow-up of the project implementation, to make an 
assessment of how the project was functioning and of the effects of the project on crime. 
In fact, local communities were asked to provide reports and many of them were never 
delivered. The change was made so as to make the municipality directly responsible for 
the implementation and follow-up of projects. In this paper, we do not evaluate the 
effects of this change (among other things, because there are not enough data), but rather 
the effects of the initial program on crime. In any case, changes made to the program 
were minor, so it is hard to conceive that the conclusions would be different after the 
modification in 2006. For instance, there has been little change with respect to the 
selection and follow-up of the projects. How municipalities select the projects remains 
essentially the same, while there are many municipalities that still do not comply with the 
evaluation report that is supposed to be delivered to the central authority. 
 
[Figure 5 around here]   
   
The selection of counties during the first years of execution of the program was in 
response to a technical process in which different variables with different weights were 
considered: robbery-with-violence rate (20%), robbery-by-force rate (15%), domestic 
violence (20%), prevalence of drug use (10%) and poverty index (35%). From these 
variables, the Criminal Risk Index was obtained. Using this index on municipalities with 18 
 
more than 70,000 inhabitants, Phase I of the program began to be implemented in 12 
municipalities. In 2002 the same criterion was used and the program was expanded to 12 
other municipalities.  
    Given that the rate of robbery is one of the criteria used in the decision to 
introduce this program in a municipality, it could also be argued that the variable Secure 
County is endogenous. 
 
 
4.  Estimation results 
 
Regional estimations 
  The GMM estimates obtained using the Arellano–Bond methodology at a regional 
level are presented in Table 2. We use a panel of 13 regions with annual observations 
from 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2003 and 2006 (the years for which the 
CASEN survey is available). The standard dynamic panel tests confirmed the validity of 
the model.   
  Estimates from our dynamic panel data model confirm that there is a significant 
persistence of robbery complaints, with the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable 
being positive and statistically significant. These results are robust since they remain 
virtually the same after we introduce additional explanatory variables in the regression. 
  Arrests per 100,000 inhabitants are statistically significant and with the expected sign. 
These results confirm that the cost of breaking the law, as measured by the arrest ratio, 
reduces the crime rate. That is to say, as the probability of being caught after a crime 
increases, the expected net benefits decline, so criminal activity declines.  19 
 
 
[Table 2 around here] 
   
   The coefficient of the unemployment rate is statistically significant and with the 
expected sign, indicating that an increase of one percentage point in the unemployment 
rate produces an increase of  nearly 56 robbery complaints per 100,000 inhabitants in the 
short run (equation 4) and an additional 40 in the long run. As the unemployment rate 
increased 4 percentage points after the recession of 1999 (from 6% to 10%), it is 
responsible for an increase of 224 robbery complaints in the short run and 393 in the long 
run. Since unemployment remained high for several years and there is persistence in the 
crime rate, it could be argued that the unemployment effect alone is responsible for about 
50% of the total increase in the crime rate in this period. This is interesting since although 
there has been much discussion about the increase in crime in Chile in the last decade, 
there has been no connection either to the economic crisis of the late 1990s, in which the 
unemployment rate increased abruptly, or to the possible persistence effect that we find in 
our estimates. It is important to note that the unemployment rate in the decade after never 
returned to the pre-1999 crisis figures. This finding is consistent with studies for other 
countries, which find a strong relation between unemployment and crime.
19 
  The coefficient of average age is negative, as expected; however, it is not statistically 
significant. The variables female heads-of-household, urban population, poverty, women 
and income inequality are statistically  not significant. That is, for the case of Chile, we 
do not find evidence that poverty or income distribution have had a significant effect on 
crime during the period of our estimations, in contrast to other studies on developing 
countries that find an important relationship between these variables.
20 Age difference 20 
 
between the mother and the oldest son has the expected sign, although it is statistically 
significant in only one of the regressions. Interestingly, the Penal Justice Reform has a 
positive and significant effect on robbery complaints, supporting the view that this new 
penal justice system facilitates the reporting of crimes. The coefficient is not only 
statistically significant, but also economically significant, suggesting that a fraction of the 
increase in crime reported is explained by the penal justice reform. This implies that not 
all increases in crime have been “real” since a part consists of more crimes being reported 
that were already being committed. 
    The coefficients of the two crime prevention programs implemented during this 
period, the Quadrant Plan and the Secure County Plan, are statistically  not significant, 
supporting an initial view that these programs did not have a significant impact on the 
crime rate. Next, both variables are interacted with arrests. It is found that when the 
Quadrant Plan is interacted with arrests, the coefficient of the interaction variable is 
negative and statistically significant. This means that in regions where the Quadrant Plan 
exists, arrests have a larger deterrent effect than in locations were the Quadrant Plan does 
not exist. The Quadrant Plan is basically more efficient policing, so this result suggests 
that the Quadrant Plan has helped to arrest the right people in an adequate time period, 
hence reducing crime.
21 Opinion polls
22 show that people know and value the Plan and 
this has been an argument not only to maintain it, but also to expand it. By 2010, it is 
expected to reach 85% of the population. 
  The coefficient of the interaction between Secure County and arrests, however, 
remains not significant, indicating that this program has not had the expected effects on 
crime. In a way, this was expected since Secure County never was designed to increase 21 
 
the efficiency of the police, but rather it was designed to drive out potential crime 
perpetrators. Hence, the effect, if any, should appear directly in the variable and not in the 
interaction. Although no formal evaluations were made of this program, the fact that it 
was modified in 2006 suggests that the qualitative evaluations were not positive. The 
results obtained in this paper are consistent with the view that this program was not being 
successful at reducing crime. 
 
Municipal estimations 
  Table 3 shows the estimations at a municipal level. As in the estimations at a regional 
level, the lagged dependent variable, arrests, unemployment and the penal justice reform 
are statistically significant and have the expected signs. The coefficient on the lagged 
dependent variable is higher, suggesting a greater difference between the short- and the 
long-run effects. None of the coefficients for crime prevention programs is statistically 
significant. However, like in our previous estimations, when the Quadrant Plan is 
interacted with arrests, its coefficient becomes statistically significant, suggesting that 
this program reduces crime as it increases the effect of the probability of arrests in the 
reduction of crime. The coefficients are remarkably stable as we introduce new variables, 
suggesting the robustness of these estimations. 
 









  This paper analyzes the impact of two anti-crime programs implemented in Chile in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s: the Quadrant Plan and the Secure County Plan. We use 
robbery complaints per 100,000 inhabitants as the dependent variable. The estimations 
are performed using data at regional and municipal levels and the results are the same. 
The estimations show that only the first of these programs had an impact and it was 
through the effect of the arrest ratio coefficient. The Quadrant Plan is a preventive 
monitoring plan in which a certain number of police officers are in charge of a territory. 
Households in that territory are informed of this situation and have easy access to these 
police officers. The program can be thought of as more policing in a given territory, but 
not necessarily because there are more police officers in that territory; rather because the 
police resources are used more efficiently (there is a clear plan, identification of 
troublesome areas and connection to the community). Unfortunately, in Chile there are no 
data on police forces per location, so it is not possible to know whether the increased 
deterrence effect of the probability of arrest (and hence in the success of the Plan) is due 
to more quantity and/or more quality of policing. 
  On the other hand, the Secure County program does not appear to have any impact 
on crime. The program is designed to involve the community in initiatives that can 
prevent crime. Although the idea seems reasonable, what has happened is that as the 
central government does not have the tools to identify the projects that, in principle, can 
have an effect on crime, they end up approving almost any project in the attempt to 
allocate resources assigned to the different communities evenly. Given this, the 
communities end up presenting projects that are not necessarily related to crime and on 23 
 
many occasions, are simply the pet projects of a local authority. This is the reason why 
the program was modified in 2006. 
  It is also found that about half of the increase in the crime rate observed in the last 
decade can be explained by the rise in the unemployment rate in the late nineties due to 
the recession of 1999 and the persistence effect found in our estimates. Indeed, the crime 
rate remained at higher levels while the unemployment rate eventually fell, although not 
to the same levels prior to the recession. The probability of arrest and the penal justice 
reform implemented in Chile have also had effects on robbery complaints. 
  We have found that only one of the two anti-crime programs implemented in Chile in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s helped reduced crime. The programs were different.  One 
(Secure County) was designed to involve the community in the selection of projects 
designed to reduce crime; the other was directed at a better organization of the police in 
fighting crime. In principle, both could have worked, so the natural question to ask is why 
is there such a difference in effectiveness between both programs?
23 The answer seems to 
be in the accountability of both programs. While in the Quadrant Plan, the responsibilities 
were clear since the police unit of a given location was clearly held responsible for the 
crime in that location, there were not clear responsibilities in the Secure County Plan. No 
one followed up on a project and no one was being held responsible for its potential 
failure. 
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Notes
                                                 
1 See Centro de Estudios Públicos, National Opinion Poll (June 2009) and Balance de la delincuencia 2008, 
Fundación Paz Ciudadana (April 2009). 
2 It has the same orientation as the C ommunity Oriented Policy Services (COPS) program in the United 
States. 
3 Similar to the National Community Safety Plan of the UK. I describe both programs implemented in Chile 
in further detail in Section III when the estimation variables are explained. 
4 For a detailed description of some projects, see Dammert and Lunecke (2004). 
5 See Wilson and Petersilia (1995) for a review. 
6 Wilson and Herrenstein (1985). 
7 They study the reallocation of police forces that took place after the terrorist attack on the main Jewish 
center in Buenos Aires, Argentina in 1994. Following that attack, all Jewish institutions received police 
protection, which implied a reallocation of police forces. 
8 A more specific definition of the variables and the sources of the data are presented in the appendix. 
9 There are 346 municipalities in Chile. We use the 245 for which we have data for this period. 
10 Unfortunately, there are no data in Chile on the municipality of residence of home perpetrators, so we 
cannot know with certainty wh at fraction of the robberies are committed by people from a different 
municipality. 
11 See National Institute of Statistics (2009). 
12 The 2006 CASEN is the latest available. A new one with data for 2009 will come out in 2010. 
13 Levitt (2004). 
14 In the old system, the delinquent would pass directly to the justice system without the police having to 
write out a complaint. 
15 Most of the resources assigned to this program (more than 80%) come from the reassignment of the 
institutional budget of the Chilean Police Force. The remaining resources have been financed with new 
resources  from  the  Budget  of  the  Nation.  Nevertheless,  there  is  no  information  available  on  the  total 
resources invested in this plan, either at regional or at a county level. This is the main reason why we could 
not measure this variable as per capita investment in the Quadrant Plan. 
 
16 The “Fundación Paz Ciudadana” is a non-profit institution  that was founded in 1992 and its objective is 
to do research on public policies related to crime.  
17 There is no information on the Quadrant Plan resources spent by location.  However, it should not be a 
major problem since it is reasonable to think that because of the characteristics of the program, the intensity 
in the Quadrant Plan should not be that different among locations where it has been applied. 
18 See Ministry of the Interior (2003). 
19 See Öster and Agell (2007). 
20 Soares and Naritomi (2008); Fajnzylber et al. (2002a). 
21 Note that this result does not reveal that more people are arrested, but that the effect of arrests on crime is 
greater.  
22 See Paz Ciudadana-Adimark Index, December  2003. 
23 Effectiveness here is used as a measure of the actual effects on the reduction of crime, not as a measure 





Description of Variables 
Variable  Description  Source 
Robbery complaints per 100,000 
inhabitants 
Robbery complaints per 100,000 inhabitants.  Police Statistical 
Yearbooks 
Female heads-of-households  Female heads-of-households as a percentage of total 
population by region or municipality. 
CASEN* 
Age  Average age of population.  CASEN* 
Female  Percentage of female population by 
region/municipality. 
INE** 
Urban population  Percentage of urban population by 
region/municipality. 
CASEN* 
Poverty  Individuals that are below the poverty line as a 
percentage of the total population. 
CASEN* 
Income Inequality  Ratio between average income of the population at 
the highest and lowest quintile of income 
distribution. 
CASEN* 
Age difference  Average difference between the age of the mother 
and her oldest son. 
CASEN* 
Unemployment  Regional unemployment rate.  INE** 
Robbery and theft arrests / 
Robbery and theft complaints 
Robbery and theft arrests as a ratio of robbery and 
theft complaints per 100,000 inhabitants. 
Police Statistical 
Yearbooks 
Penal Justice Reform  Dummy that takes the value of 1 from the moment 
the reform is implemented in a region. 
Chilean Justice 
Ministry 
Quadrant Plan  Percentage of regional population that is monitored 
by the Quadrant Plan (for regional estimations). 
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 from the 
moment the plan is introduced in a municipality (for 
municipal estimates). 
Under Secretary 
of the National 
Police 
Secure County  Per capita resources invested in the program by 
each municipality/region. 
Balance de la 
delincuencia, 
Paz Ciudadana 
(Robbery and theft arrests / 
Robbery and theft complaints)* 
Quadrant Plan Dummy 
Robbery and theft arrests as a ratio of robbery and 
theft complaints per 100,000 inhabitants * Dummy 
that takes the value of 1 for the municipality/region 




of the National 
Police. 
(Robbery and theft arrests / 
Robbery and theft complaints)* 
Secure County Dummy 
Robbery and theft arrests as a ratio of robbery and 
theft complaints per 100,000 inhabitants * Dummy 
that takes the value of 1 for the municipality/region 




*Surveys of Socioeconomic Characteristics of the Chilean Population.  




Top Five Concerns of the Population 
Source: Centro de Estudios Públicos, National Opinion Poll. 
 
Figure 2 
Chile: Robbery complaints per 100,000 inhabitants 
Source: Police Statistical Yearbooks. 
 
Figure 3 
Robbery complaint and unemployment rate 




Percentage of population covered by “Quadrant Plan” 
Source: Fundación Paz Ciudadana. 
 
Figure 5 
Per capita annual investment in “Secure County” 
(Chilean Pesos) 






Robbery complaints as a percentage of effective robbery 








2000  May  43.2  -2.2  - 
October  44.7  -0.7    
2001  May  47.0  1.6  8.8 
October  43.3  -2.1    
2002  June  41.8  -3.6  -11.1 
November  44.3  -1.1    
2003  June  43.2  -2.2  3.3 
October  45.4  0.0    
2004  June  46.8  1.4  8.3 
November  50.1  4.7    
2005  June  46.8  1.4  0.0 
November  44.2  -1.2    
2006  June  46.7  1.3  -0.2 
November  49.5  4.1    
2007  June  46.8  1.4  0.2 
2008  June  42.4  -3.0  -9.4 
              
Average  45.4  0.0  0.0 
               For household members, during the last 6 months. 
               Source: Paz Ciudadana and Adimark, 2005. 33 
 
Table 2 
Arellano Bond Regional Estimations 
 
Dependent variable: Complaints per 100,000 inhabitants 
   Equation 1  Equation 2  Equation 3  Equation 4 
Complaints per 100,000 inhabitants (t-1)  0.38*  0.42**  0.42**  0.43** 
   (0.19)  (0.19)  (0.19)  (0.18) 
Robbery and theft arrests/Robbery and   -468.72***  -447.69***  -550.08***  -569.06*** 
theft complaints  (98.12)  (137.94)  (158.58)  (176.84) 
(Robbery and theft arrests/Robbery and   -613.53**  -621.65*  -640.24*  -626.23* 
theft complaints)*Quadrant Plan Dummy  (297.28)  (323.95)  (335.50)  (324.35) 
(Robbery and theft arrests/Robbery and   148.02  -88.66  -75.28  -78.72 
theft complaints)*Secure County Dummy   (271.23)  (308.66)  (311.87)  (311.05) 
Quadrant Plan  3.11  3.84  4.26  4.24 
   (3.05)  (3.39)  (3.16)  (3.15) 
Secure County  0.47  0.72  0.70  0.71 
   (0.32)  (0.49)  (0.47)  (0.47) 
Unemployment  39.23***  53.99***  55.08***  56.72** 
   (10.61)  (20.02)  (20.36)  (21.96) 
Penal Justice Reform  278.81***  270.86***  262.33***  255.74*** 
   (102.72)  (95.53)  (96.78)  (91.52) 
Female heads-of-household  0.00  -5.82  -5.03  -6.52 
   (10.34)  (16.59)  (16.59)  (16.96) 
Women  -7.15  15.10  16.64  15.86 
   (23.30)  (46.84)  (46.88)  (47.39) 
Age difference (between mother and   -85.07**  -57.95  -52.92  -51.02 
 oldest son)  (37.79)  (46.33)  (43.41)  (43.99) 
Age  -10.29  -51.49  -57.26  -64.52 
   (24.46)  (67.21)  (63.32)  (69.63) 
Poverty     -8.02  -9.45  -10.31 
      (10.97)  (11.75)  (12.57) 
Urban population        -629.69  -556.49 
         (1328.93)  (1315.42) 
Income inequality           -5.49 
            (8.66) 
Observations  91  91  91  91 
Number of groups  13  13  13  13 
Sargan test (p-value)  0.5124  0.6920  0.6913  0.7162 
Serial Correlation Order 1  0.0131  0.0142  0.0143  0.0160 
Serial Correlation Order 2  0.2669  0.1053  0.1238  0.1590 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 




Arellano-Bond Municipal Estimations 
 
Dependent variable: Complaints per 100,000 inhabitants 
   Equation 1  Equation 2  Equation 3  Equation 4 
Complaints per 100,000 inhabitants (t-1)  0.94**  0.91**  0.90**  0.91** 
   (0.36)  (0.36)  (0.37)  (0.37) 
Robbery and theft arrests/Robbery and   -144.74*  -142.82*  -145.69*  -147.46* 
theft complaints  (76.49)  (78.92)  (80.43)  (80.88) 
(Robbery and theft arrests/Robbery and   -1,566.64*  -1,653.53*  -1,685.11*  -1,672.02* 
theft complaints)*Quadrant Plan Dummy  (951.76)  (958.16)  (954.35)  (953.92) 
(Robbery and theft arrests/Robbery and theft   837.45  867.83  867.56  860.58 
 complaints)*Secure County Dummy  (933.53)  (970.54)  (966.19)  (964.04) 
Quadrant Plan  784.00  870.32  901.32  890.61 
   (607.85)  (571.77)  (582.10)  (582.84) 
Secure County  -0.78  -0.83  -0.84  -0.83 
   (0.60)  (0.62)  (0.62)  (0.62) 
Unemployment  25.30***  25.19***  25.33***  25.43*** 
   (6.23)  (6.53)  (6.50)  (6.51) 
Penal Justice Reform  165.24***  166.39***  169.39***  170.59*** 
   (53.02)  (50.02)  (48.07)  (48.30) 
Female heads-of-household  2.01  2.14  2.68  2.68 
   (4.61)  (4.53)  (4.05)  (4.05) 
Women  -11.95  -11.51  -11.06  -11.34 
   (9.75)  (9.62)  (9.54)  (9.56) 
Age difference (between mother and   31.91  31.14  29.53  29.63 
 oldest son)  (26.66)  (26.87)  (26.44)  (26.46) 
Age  -12.80  -12.28  -12.41  -12.41 
   (21.98)  (24.41)  (24.21)  (24.22) 
Poverty     -0.06  -0.20  -0.30 
      (2.75)  (2.77)  (2.77) 
Urban population        -239.43  -263.58 
         (491.46)  (494.51) 
Income inequality           0.71 
            (0.88) 
Observations  843  843  843  842 
Number of groups  245  245  245  245 
Sargan test (p-value)  0.2513  0.2136  0.1287  0.1264 
Serial Correlation Order 1  0.0418  0.0383  0.0382  0.0383 
Serial Correlation Order 2  0.1429  0.1382  0.1372  0.1352 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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